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Abstract 
The literature contains very few impact evaluations of health sector reforms, especially those involving broad and simultaneous 
changes on both the demand and supply sides of the sector.  This paper reports the results of a World Bank-funded health sector 
reform project in China known as Health VIII. On the supply-side, the project combined infrastructure investments (especially at the 
township level) with improved planning and management, including a referral system between township health centers and county 
hospitals, and interventions aimed at improving the effectiveness and quality of care, including the introduction of clinical protocols 
and essential drug lists. On the demand-side, the project sought to resurrect community health insurance, and to introduce a safety 
net for the very poor to provide them with financial assistance with their health care expenses. The evaluation reported here 
concerns just one of the project’s seven provinces, namely Gansu, the reason being that no suitable data are available to undertake 
a rigorous evaluation in all provinces. This paper makes use of a panel dataset collected for quite another purpose but whose timing 
(just around the time the project started and four years later) and location (covering both project and non-project counties) makes 
it well suited to the task.  The paper compares estimates obtained using a variety of different estimators, including naïve single 
differences (before and after, and with and without the project), and differences in differences, adjusting for heterogeneity through 
both regression and matching methods. The results suggest that it makes a difference to the estimated impact of Health VIII which 
estimator is used, with the naïve single differences producing often markedly different estimates from the preferred approach of 
combining difference-in-differences with matching.  The results suggest that Health VIII has been mostly successful in its goals. The 
preferred estimator suggests that the project reduced illness among children, improved self-assessed health and increased doctor 
visits among the population in general, and reduced the incidence of catastrophic health spending, defined as annual spending in 
excess of 10% of annual per capita income. However, the project appears to have increased the development and use of high-level 
facilities, hastened the demise of the village clinic, and may have reduced immunization rates.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
With national governments, donors and the international development community 
growing ever more anxious to see hard evidence of the impact of public programs, and with 
health featuring so prominently in development objectives, it is reassuring that some recent 
impact evaluations in the developing world have involved the health sector. The picture could, 
however, be much rosier than it is.  
One problem is that the methodologies used are not always clearly documented, so that 
one cannot always be sure how reliable the results are. For example, a recent high-profile 
collection of 17 studies (Levine 2004), purporting to show considerable impact of public health 
interventions in terms of premature deaths averted, contains no information whatsoever on the 
methods used in the studies. Where the methods used in health sector impact evaluations have 
been subjected to critical scrutiny, they have often been found inadequate. For example, a recent 
review (Kapoor 2002) of impact evaluations conducted by the World Bank’s independent 
Operations Evaluation Department (OED) over the last 25 years found that neither of the two 
health sector projects that had been evaluated had been done so in a rigorous way. Moreover, 
among the relatively few health sector impact evaluations known to be rigorous, very few 
concern health system reforms, being more likely to concern the impacts of inputs in the health 
production function, or the effects on health outcomes of policy changes outside the health 
sector.
1 There are exceptions. Newman et al. (2002) report impacts on child mortality of health 
facility infrastructure investments. Saadah et al. (2001) report the impacts on utilization of 
                                                 
1 Examples of the former include the paper by Jalan and Ravallion (2003) which looks at the effects of piped water on diarrheal 
disease among children, and the paper by Miguel and Kremer (2004) which looks at the effects of deworming treatment. 
Examples of the latter include Case’s (2002) study of the effect of an old age pension program on inter alia the health of members 
of the pensioner’s household, and the study by Galiani et al. (2005) of the effect on child mortality of the privatization of water 
services.    2
Indonesia’s health card introduced after the economic crisis of the late 1990s. Gertler (2004) 
reports the effects on health outcomes of a conditional cash transfer program that required 
mothers to take their children for regular health checks to receive the cash supplement. And 
Wagstaff and Pradhan (2005) examine the effects on health utilization and health outcomes of a 
social health insurance program. Such studies are, however, relatively few in number. 
Furthermore, all concern a relatively small policy adjustment—none looks at a system reform of 
the type where several changes are introduced together, possibly operating on the demand and 
supply sides simultaneously.
2,3 And yet much of what national governments and donors do in the 
health sector involves making broad changes to health systems. Over the period 1995-2005, for 
example, 40% of the World Bank’s health sector lending was classified as being directed at 
“[improving] health system performance”.
4  
This paper reports the results of an impact evaluation of a World Bank-financed health 
sector reform project in China, known officially as the World Bank China Basic Health Service 
Project but more often referred to simply as ‘Health VIII’. The evaluation in the paper is partial 
in that it covers just one of the seven provinces where the project operated, namely Gansu. The 
reason for the focus on Gansu is the lack of suitable data to undertake a full-scale impact 
evaluation of Health VIII. The project collected baseline household data only in project 
counties—in fact, in only 28 of Health VIII’s 71 counties.
5 Even now, seven years after the start 
                                                 
2 As of April 27, 2005, the World Bank’s impact evaluation database listed 41 impact evaluations of relevance to the health, 
nutrition and population sector. Not one of these fell into the category “Health Reform and Financing”. The database is available 
online at http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/poverty/ie/evaluationdb.htm.  
3 See Ravallion (2005) for a recent review of impact evaluations, including those in the health sector.  
4 In the richer IBRD countries, the share rises to 50%. The classification system is not, it has to be acknowledged, watertight. 
Some projects concerning communicable disease control are listed under this subheading, though this may be due to the fact they 
contain components aimed at health system strengthening. It is also possible that some projects that involve health system reform 
get classified under non-health heads in the bank’s system, such as private sector development. My thanks to Lucia Kossarova for 
providing the breakdown of Bank lending.  
5 Health VIII began initially in October 1998 in 28 counties, and was subsequently extended to a further 43 counties in late 1999. 
The official project baseline covers only the initial 28 counties. A further 25 (part B) counties were added to the project even 
later. As in the government’s report of Health VIII, the present paper when referring to Health VIII is referring to the 71 counties 
joining the project in 1998 and 1999.    3
of the project, no follow-up household data have been collected; there are, in fact, no plans 
currently to collect any. The (panel) household data used in this paper—from the Gansu Survey 
of Children and Families (GSCF)—were collected by researchers quite independently of the 
Health VIII project. Serendipitously, the GSFC covers both project and non-project counties, 
before and after implementation of the Health VIII project. The case of Gansu is not without 
interest. Gansu is home to 26 million people—larger in population terms than most countries
6—
and is China’s second poorest province. Given the emphasis in Health VIII’s objectives of 
improving health among China’s rural poor, knowing whether Health VIII worked in Gansu is 
not inconsequential. And while one would like to know something about the impact of the 
project in the other six project provinces, the fact is that the required data are not—and never will 
be—available to undertake a rigorous full-scale impact evaluation of Health VIII. In the 
circumstances, knowing something about the project’s impact in one province seems a distinct 
improvement on the alternative.  
Health VIII marked a break with the past in terms of the World Bank’s support to China’s 
health sector, and provides an opportunity to study the impact of a health sector reform that is 
broader than those that have been the subject of impact evaluations to date. In contrast to 
previous Bank health projects in China that had focused on specific diseases such as 
Tuberculosis or on specific groups such as women and children, Health VIII was a system-wide 
project.
7 Its goals were to raise the quality, affordability and utilization of health services, 
especially among the poor, and to promote ‘financial protection’ by strengthening risk-pooling 
arrangements. On the supply-side, the project combined infrastructure investments (especially at 
township level) with improved planning and management, including a referral system between 
                                                 
6 Only 37 countries in the world have a larger population than the province of Gansu.  
7 Health VIII was selected by the Bank as one of its ten best projects across all sectors in 1998. Details of the project are available 
in English in Ministry of Health (undated).    4
township health centers and county hospitals, and interventions aimed at improving the 
effectiveness and quality of care, including the introduction of clinical protocols and essential 
drug lists. On the demand-side, the project sought to resurrect community health insurance, and 
to introduce a safety net for the very poor to provide them with financial assistance with their 
health care expenses.  
In this paper, we use household data to assess whether Health VIII impacted favorably on 
health service utilization, health outcomes, and out-of-pocket health spending. We also use 
village data to assess the impact of Health VIII on the availability and perceived quality of health 
services at village level, the perceived quality of care at township level, and immunization rates. 
The paper is organized as follows: section II outlines the methods used; section III outlines the 
data; section IV presents the results; and the final section contains a discussion and our 
conclusions.  
II. METHODS 
We compare the results obtained using a number of different estimators. The simplest are 
based on single differences. The first is the before-and-after difference, which is the mean 
change in outcome before and after the project within the project counties. This is the estimator 
that was presumably in the minds of those responsible for the project’s evaluation when they 
decided to field the Health VIII baseline survey only in the project counties, and was the 
estimator used in the evaluation of the Bank’s project in China on Schistosomiasis control 
(Xianyi, Liying et al. 2005). Its obvious limitation is that it assumes that no changes occurred in 
areas not covered by the project, a limitation that is evident in the evaluation of the Bank’s China 
TB control project (China_Tuberculosis_Control_Collaboration 2004): pulmonary TB fell   5
considerably in non-project counties, so that making a counterfactual assumption of no change in 
TB in non-project counties would have led to a substantial overestimate of the impact of the 
project. As will be seen below, reliance on the before-and-after difference estimator in the Health 
VIII context would also lead to some misleading conclusions.  
The second single difference estimator we use is the with-and-without difference, which 
compares the mean outcomes (after the project) between those subjected to Health VIII (‘the 
treated’) and those not subjected to the project (‘the untreated’). Let yit be the outcome of interest 
for individual i at time t (t=1,2), and Ti equal one if individual i lives in a project county and zero 
otherwise. Then the with-and-without difference estimator can be implemented by means of the 
convenient regression:  
(1)  it i it T y ε γ α + + =  t=2, 
which is estimated using data from the second (post-treatment) period only. One obvious drawback of this is that is attributes any 
difference to the intervention, whereas differences may be due to other factors. An obvious way to try to take such factors into 
account is to add a set of covariates, xkit, to eqn (1), to get:  
(2)  it kit k k i it x T y ε φ γ α + + + = ∑  t=2.  
If the error term is uncorrelated with the Health VIII treatment indicator, T, the coefficient γ estimates the average treatment effect 
(cf. e.g. Wooldridge 2002).
8  
The problem is that this assumption is unlikely to be satisfied. It would not be warranted 
in the present context if people in the Health VIII counties share common characteristics that (a) 
influence outcomes and (b) are either observable but omitted from xk or unobservable. As Health 
VIII was not placed randomly in Gansu’s counties (this issues is discussed further below), this is 
a distinct possibility. One way to take into account selection on observables is to use a control 
function estimator (cf. e.g. Wooldridge 2002). This involves including, alongside the xk in eqn 
(2), transformations of these variables interacted with T. In what follows we follow 
                                                 
8 All the results in the paper relate to the average treatment effect which is a weighted average of the effect of treatment on the 
treated and the effect of treatment on the untreated (cf. e.g. Wooldridge 2002).    6
Wooldridge’s (2002) approach and include lagged values of the xk as well as de-meaned values 
of the lagged xk interacted with the Health VIII treatment variable, T: 
(3)  ( ) it i kt kit k k kit k k i it T x x x T y ε ϑ φ γ α + ⋅ − + + + = − − − ∑ ∑ 1 1 1  t=2.  
This approach is useful in the present study, because although we observe at two dates variables that are plausible candidates for 
the xk, there are some outcome variables that we observe only in the second wave of the GSFC—i.e. after the Health VIII project 
started.  
For most outcome variables, we have longitudinal data from before and after the 
implementation of Health VIII. For these indicators, we can employ the double-difference or 
difference-in-differences estimator. This compares the mean before-and-after change among 
people living in the project areas with the mean before-and-after change among people living in 
non-project areas. Let Pt equal one if period t is after the project has been implemented. Then the 
double-difference estimator can be implemented by the convenient regression (cf. e.g. Cameron 
and Trivedi 2005):  
(4)  it i t i t it T P T P y ε δ γ β α + ⋅ + + + =  t=1,2 
where the interaction term PtTi equals one for the treated individuals in the post-intervention period, and the coefficient δ is the 
difference-in-difference estimate. Or the double-difference estimator can be implemented by regressing the change in outcome over 
time on a treatment dummy: 
(5)  it i it T y ε δ β Δ + + = Δ  t=1,2, 
where  Δ is the difference operator. The double-difference estimator sweeps out the effects of time-invariant influences on 
outcomes, both observed and unobserved, and in effect nets out any changes that could be considered likely to have occurred 
anyway. One can also add covariates to eqns (3) and (4) (cf. e.g. Cameron and Trivedi 2005), to get, for example: 
(6)  it kit k k i t i t it x T P T P y ε φ δ γ β α + + ⋅ + + + = ∑ , 
which we refer to below as the double-difference estimator with covariates.  
Combining differencing with covariates is just one way of controlling for heterogeneity. 
An alternative—and cleaner and less restrictive—approach is to combine differencing with 
matching (cf. e.g. Heckman, Ichimura et al. 1997; Imbens 2004; Ravallion 2005). In contrast to 
the regression approach, no functional form for the outcome variable need be assumed. We 
combine matching with double differencing but also with single differencing. For outcomes that 
we observe only in wave 2, computing matched single (i.e. post-intervention) differences is the   7
best we can do in a matching approach. For outcomes where we observe outcomes before and 
after the start of Health VIII, the matched single differences will serve as some sort of check on 
how much faith we should have in the matched single differences for those outcomes where we 
have only post-intervention data. 
The idea behind matching is to compare individuals in project areas with similar 
individuals in similar non-project areas. So, for example, in computing the differences 
underlying the average effect of treatment on the treated, we use only matched  untreated 
individuals, not all untreated individuals. We perform the matching at two levels—the county 
and the individual. We first run a probit regression across all 76 of Gansu’s counties to predict 
the probability of the county being a Health VIII project county. We then match individuals on 
the Health VIII county propensity score as well as pre-intervention values of household- and 
individual-level variables, using the Mahanobolis metric to measure the closeness of matches 
across these several dimensions (cf. e.g. Adadie, Drukker et al. 2004). This permits a tradeoff 
between county characteristics on the one hand and individual and household characteristics on 
the other: one might end up choosing as a comparison individual someone from a county that has 
a relatively low probability of being a Health VIII county but who in terms of individual and 
household characteristics is so close to the treated individual that choosing as a comparison 
someone from another county would lead to a less good match. In the event, as will be seen, the 
matching procedure results in us choosing as comparisons people in a handful of non-project 
counties that have propensity scores that are very close to those of the Health VIII counties.    8
III. DATA  
The Heath VIII project operates in 10 of Gansu’s 76 counties. Three of these (Dingxi, 
Kang and Wudu), have been surveyed in the GSFC. One (Wudu) was one of the original 28 first-
wave Health VIII counties: in these counties, the project began in October 1998. The other two 
counties (Dingxi and Kang) joined Health VIII in late 1999. The first wave of GSFC data were 
collected in June 2000, somewhat after the start of Health VIII, but given its complexity and 
scope, it seems unlikely that much—if any—impact will have been felt by the time of the first 
wave of the GSFC, especially in Dingxi and Kang. In addition to collecting data in the three 
Health VIII counties, the GSFC also collected data from households in 17 of Gansu’s 66 non-
project counties. The same households were then revisited in mid-2004, and a second wave of 
data were collected.  
The GSFC panel contains 1,116 individuals (186 households) living in the three Health 
VIII counties, and 6,465 individuals (1,148 households) living in the 17 non-project counties. 
The household questionnaires contain key information for all household members on health 
outcomes, service utilization and household health spending. In addition, we have data on health 
and health service utilization from the second wave on 186 GSFC ‘target’ children. In addition to 
these datasets, we have some village-level health data from questionnaires administered to the 
leaders of the 100 GSFC villages. These provide a useful complement to the household data.  
The individual-level outcomes for all household members that we examine include health 
outcomes, doctor visits, and out-of-pocket health spending on outpatient care and medicines. 
These are detailed in Table 1. The self-assessed health variable is of the type used in a variety of 
surveys in industrialized countries, as well as in several developing country surveys such as the 
Indonesia Family Life Survey and the China Health and Nutrition Survey. In industrialized   9
countries, at least, it has been found to be a good predictor of mortality and the onset of disability 
(cf. Idler and Benyamini 1997). The chronic illness variable was defined differently in the two 
waves, which makes its use somewhat problematic in the double differences. In addition to 
looking at the impact of Health VIII on mean or expected out-of-pocket health spending, we also 
examine its impact on the probability of the individual having catastrophic health spending, 
defined here as spending exceeding 10% of annual per capita income (cf. e.g. Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer 2003).  
Two of the health outcome indicators moved in opposite directions to the other two: the 
self-assessed health and disability indicators suggested a worsening in health outcomes, while 
the chronic illness variable and the number of sickness days suggest the opposite. The dramatic 
reduction in chronic illness probably reflects the change in the way the question was posed, with 
a list being used in wave 2 but not in wave 1. The fall in the number of doctor visits and the 
increase in expenses on doctor visits are in line with trends reported from other China surveys. 
The significant decline in drug outlays is rather surprising, and may reflect a different allocation 
between the two expense categories over the two waves. We explored the sensitivity of the 
results to combining the two categories but found little difference. The catastrophic spending 
indicator points to a reduction in very large expenses between the two waves.  
The outcomes variables for the target child are listed in Table 2. These are available for 
the second wave only. We explore the impact of Health VIII on the probability of the child being 
taken to the doctor in the previous 12 months, with and without controlling for illness. In the 
matching approach, to control for illness, we match exactly on illness. We explore the impact on 
type of provider used only among those reporting some visits—in the matching approach, we do 
this by matching exactly on the dummy doctor visits variable.    10
The household- and individual-level covariates that we use in the regression and 
matching analyses (Table 3) suggest rising incomes, but also point to a sharp rise in insurance 
coverage. Those who have insurance in the second wave typically have school insurance, the 
annual premium for which is recorded in the survey, and is very low (RMB 30)—well below the 
premium paid for other types of insurance, likely reflecting a limited set of risks covered, 
presumably the relatively inexpensive childhood illnesses and preventive activities.  
In common with villages elsewhere in China, GSFC villages have tended to lose their 
clinic (Table 4). Where clinics have survived, they have tended to increase their staff numbers, 
though not significantly so in the case of midwives. Villages have also shifted their preferences 
somewhat towards lower-level providers, but the change is not marked. According to data from 
the village leader interviews, there has been a significant drop in immunization coverage in the 
GSFC villages in the period in question.
9 Data on perceptions by village leaders of the quality of 
medical care are available only for the second wave. Interestingly, the quality of care in village 
clinics is rated more highly than that in township health centers.  
For the matching we also require a county-level variable indicating the probability of the 
county being selected as a Health VIII county. The criteria for selecting a county for inclusion in 
Health VIII are spelt out in the project documentation. Poor counties—as reflected in whether 
they are nationally or provincially designated poverty counties—are preferred, ceteris paribus. 
All Health VIII counties in Gansu are, in fact, poverty counties. Counties with poor health 
outcomes, as reflected in high child mortality, are also preferred. How this is operationalized is 
something of a mystery, as reliable county-level data on child mortality do not exist, or at least 
                                                 
9 The recent falls in immunization coverage in poorer parts of rural China were commented on in the 2004 International Review 
of China’s Expanded Program on Immunizations (EPI) conducted by the World Health Organization, the United Nation’s 
Children Fund, the Global Alliance for Vaccine Initiative, the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the U.S. Centers for 
Disease Control.    11
are not in the public domain. A further consideration is the county’s fiscal position. In China, it is 
the central government that borrows from the World Bank. Beijing then on-lends to provinces, 
charging a fee in the process, and the province then on-lends to the county, again charging a fee 
for its services. Counties with very limited resources will not be able to repay the provincial 
government, and are therefore less likely ceteris paribus to end up with a World Bank project in 
health or any other sector. The final consideration is the county’s capacity to implement the 
project, with counties with high capacity being preferred. This increases the likelihood of the 
project achieving its objectives, but seems likely to tilt the scales against poorer counties.  
Table 5 reports the results of two county-level probit regressions (data refer to 2000). The 
second is included because the very high correlation among the covariates makes it hard to detect 
their independent effects—basically, per capita income is either a cause or consequence of most 
of the indicators. The results confirm that, within poverty counties, richer counties have a higher 
probability of being a Health VIII county, and suggest strongly that counties with more health 
sector capacity, as proxied by the number of hospital beds, also have a higher probability of 
being selected for inclusion. Health VIII is clearly not reaching the poorest of the poor. From the 
probit equation, a propensity score is computed for each county, using the full model rather than 
the more parsimonious model.    12
Table 1: Outcome variables—individual-level from household questionnaire  







of health  
Very poor (1), poor, average, good, very 
good (5).  
Assessment is by one respondent for all household members.   4.136  3.971  -11.94 
Chronic 
illness  
No (0), yes (1). See comment.   In wave 1, respondents were asked whether in the past year they 
had suffered from any chronic disease. In wave 2, they were asked 
whether they suffered from any of the following: cancer, heart 
disease, diabetes, hepatitis or other. If the answer was none, we 
coded them as not having a chronic illness in wave 2.  
0.064 0.037  -8.32 
Disability  Classified as disabled if respondent says yes 
to any of the following types of disability 
read out to the respondent by the interviewer: 
deaf or mute; blind; bodily disability; mental 
illness; retarded; or ‘other’.  
 0.125  0.158  2.62 
Sickness 
days 
No. days in past 3 months when sickness 
precluded respondent from carrying out his 
or her daily activities, such as work or 
school.  
 1.637  1.202  -3.18 
Doctor visits  No. visits in the last year to a doctor.   In Wave 1 respondents were initially asked whether they had 
stayed in a hospital, and then asked whether they had seen a 
doctor. Presumably the hospital question in wave 1 refers to 
inpatient episodes and the doctor visit question in both waves to 
outpatient visits.  
1.867 1.049  -12.67 
Doctor visit 
expenses  
Amount spent in last 12 months by the 
household on behalf of respondent for doctor 
visits.  
In wave 1 each household member was asked how much had been 
spent on medical advice. Whether this could have included 
expenses associated with inpatient care is unclear. In wave 2, each 
household member was asked how much had been spent on seeing 
a doctor. Explicitly listed as examples but not separately itemized 
were the registration fee, diagnosis fee, examination fee, and cost 
of medicines obtained from doctor.  
77.643 156.044 4.28 
Drug 
expenses 
Amount spent by the household on behalf of 
the respondent in last 12 months purchasing 
medicines.  
It is not explicit but presumably the case that medicines obtained 
during doctor visits are included under ‘doctor visit expenses’ and 
not under ‘drug expenses’.  
66.726 55.486 -2.34   13
     Table 1 (contin): Outcome variables—individual-level from household questionnaire  








Equals 1 if annual expenses associated with 
doctor visits and drugs exceeded 10% of 
household per capita income.  
 0.189  0.141  -8.07   14
Table 2: Outcome variables—GSFC target children  
Variable Definition  Comment  Mean 
Wave 2 
Ill in last year  No (0), yes (1).   Mother is asked whether during the last 12 months the child has been 
diagnosed by a doctor with the following: anemia, asthma or other chronic 
respiratory diseases, TB, pneumonia or other acute respiratory diseases, 
cold, injury due to accidents, diarrhea, eye illness, or parasite disease. The 




No (0), yes (1).   Mother was asked whether child had been taken during the last 12 months to 
a doctor to receive medical care. Question is asked irrespective of whether 





last 12 months 
0=none; 1=village clinic; 2=township health center; 
3=county hospital 
Mean in last column is among users only.   1.717   15
Table 3: Household and individual covariates for outcome equations and matching 





Sex  Male = 1     0.515  0.515   
Age  Age in years    25.295  29.269   
Health insurance   1 if the household member is covered, 0 
otherwise 
In wave 1, each household member was asked how their 
health care was paid for: self-paid, cooperative medical 
scheme (CMS), health insurance, free at public expense 
(includes GIS), or other. Household member is classified as 
insured if he or she has CMS, health insurance, or free at 
public expense. In wave 2 the household as a whole was 
asked whether any family member had health insurance 
including CMS. A follow-up question is then asked of each 
member who has insurance establishing the type of insurance 
that they have (employer, rural CMS and rural health 
insurance, private insurance, school health insurance, or 
other). Household member is classified as insured on the 
basis of answers to these two questions.  
0.003 0.182 39.80 
Years of schooling  Years spent by respondent in education    13.561  16.771  50.48 
Household per 
capita income 
Income from agriculture, livestock, 
wages and self-employment.  
Wage income includes bonuses, subsidies, and the value of 
in-kind payments.  
1844.291 3351.850  8.00   16
Table 4: Village-level variables  
Variable  Definition  Mean Wave 1  Mean Wave 2  t-test 
Clinic exists in village  =1 if a clinic exists in the village  0.95  0.89  1.60 
# doctors in nearest village clinic  # doctors working in village clinic or nearest 
village clinic if none in village 
2.74 3.69  2.37 
# nurses in nearest village clinic  # nurses working in village clinic or nearest 
village clinic if none in village 
0.74 2.53  5.64 
# midwives in nearest village clinic  # midwives working in village clinic or nearest 
village clinic if none in village 
1.95 2.08  0.13 
Provider preference by villagers  When villagers need to see a doctor, where do 
they usually go? 1=village doctor; 2=township 
hospital; 3=pharmacy nearby; 4=county hospital  
1.82 1.60  1.60 
Immunization rate in village  Immunization rate for children in the village  97.90  94.69  2.42 
Quality of village clinic  What is the village leader’s rating of the quality of 
medical care in the village clinic or in the clinic of 
the village nearby? 1=bad; 4=very good  
 2.40  
Quality of township health center  What is the village leader’s rating of the quality of 
medical care in the township hospital? 1=bad; 
4=very good  
 2.16    17
Table 5: County-level probit equation used to predict placement of Health VIII 
Variable Mean  Coefficient  z-statistics Coefficient z-statistic 
Fraction of the population classified as rural  0.83  10.22119  1.04  10.24852  1.97 
GDP  per  capita  2905.49 0.00055  1.60 0.00035  1.71 
Per capita local government revenue  201.61  -0.00094  -0.34     
Per capita local government spending   524.78  -0.00032  -0.19     
Per capita completed investment in construction  625.89  0.00047  0.70     
Per capita accumulated savings  2145.86 -0.00045  -0.77     
Telephone connections per 10,000 population  480.10  -0.00093  -0.43     
Hospital beds per 10,000 population  19.06  0.07831  1.40  0.04856  1.86 
Social welfare institution beds per 10,000 population  2.52  -0.25324  -1.70     
Primary school enrollment per 10,000 population  1194.45  -0.00179  -0.94     
Secondary school enrollment per 10,000 population  438.42  0.00112  0.52     
Pseudo R
2   0.3445   0.2104   
Note: Data are from National Bureau of Statistics county database and refer to 2000.  Sample includes all Gansu counties, not just those in GSFC. 
   18
IV. RESULTS 
This section presents the individual-level and village-level estimates of the impact of 
Health VIII on key outcomes. A discussion of the results—whether they are plausible and 
possible reasons for them—is postponed until section V.  
Table 6 presents the impact results for the individual-level variables. One important 
finding is worth highlighting immediately—the results for several outcomes vary considerably 
depending on which method is used. For example, if one focuses on the before-and-after change 
in self-assessed health, Health VIII appears to have worsened health, albeit not significantly. But 
as is clear from the the results obtained through double-differences without covariates added, the 
non-project counties experienced a much larger deterioration in self-assessed health than did the 
Health VIII counties. Indeed, the estimators other than the before-and-after difference suggest 
that self-assessed health improved as a result of Health VIII. The before-and-after estimator also 
gives misleading results for other outcomes. It suggests, for example, that Health VIII reduced 
the number of doctor visits—by as much as 1.4 visits per person per year. The other estimators 
suggest either that Health VIII reduced the number of visits but by much less, or in the case of 
the double-difference increased  the number of visits. But it is not just the before-and-after 
difference that gives misleading results. The other single-difference—the post-intervention 
difference between the Health VIII and non-project counties—is also misleading in several 
cases.  
One key influence on many results is whether matching is used rather than adding 
covariates to a regression equation. The reason for this is that the matching approach restricts 
comparisons to a subset of GSFC counties that are similar to Health VIII counties. Table 7 shows   19
for each Health VIII county the propensity score, the number of sampled individuals, and how 
they are matched in computing the treatment effect for the treated across non-project counties. 
Also shown are the propensity scores of the non-project counties. (The counties not used as 
matches are not listed.) So, for example, most of sampled individuals in Wudu county are 
matched with individuals in Qin’an county whose propensity score comes closest to that of 
Wudu. However, a few are matched to people in Yongjing county, because although Yongjing’s 
propensity score is further from Wudu’s than that of Qin’an, the individuals found as matches in 
Yongjing are on balance more similar than the best matches that can be found in the GSFC in 
Qin’an county, taking into account the county propensity score, the individual characteristics and 
the household characteristics. Overall, Qin’an and Yongjing provide the bulk of matches for the 
three Health VIII counties. Given this, it is unsurprising that the results obtained using the 
matching method are often quite different from those obtained using other methods where people 
in all non-project counties are used in computing the relevant difference.  
Focusing on the preferred matched double-difference estimates, Table 6 suggests that 
Health VIII significantly increased the number of doctor visits, but did not significantly reduce 
expected health spending, chronic illness or sickness days. Like other estimators, the matched 
difference-in-differences estimator also suggests that Health VIII led to a statistically significant 
improvement in self-assessed health and to a reduction in the incidence of catastrophic health 
spending. The results for the target child
10 on health status are consistent with these results 
(Table 8), suggesting that Health VIII reduced the probability of illness. However, the results 
also suggest that the project significantly reduced the probability of a doctor visit, although not 
conditional on being ill. The target child results also suggest that Health VIII encouraged 
                                                 
10  The covariates and matching variables used are the same as those used in Table 6 but are household averages.  So, for 
example, it is not the child’s own years of education that is used but rather the average years of all household members.     20
families who did take their child to a provider to seek a higher-level provider than would 
otherwise have been the case.  
This is a result that comes through too in the village-level results, though the impact in 
the case of the village data is not significant (Table 9).
11 What the village level data do suggest is 
that irrespective of the estimator used, Health VIII hastened the collapse of the village clinic. 
Conditional on there being a clinic, there is also a hint that Health VIII also pushes down the 
number of staff working in village clinics, though the matched double-difference results are not 
significant for any category of staff.  
One further result that emerges from Table 7—and a worrying one if true—is that Health 
VIII may have had a negative impact on immunization coverage in Gansu.
12 The results vary 
according to the estimator used, but the fact that the preferred matched double-difference 
estimator produces a statistically significant negative average treatment effect is worrying. The 
final set of village-level results concern the perceived quality of medical care in village clinics 
and township hospitals. The evidence is limited to the post-treatment comparisons, because data 
are available only for the second wave, but we take some comfort from the fact that the matched 
post-treatment and matched double-difference estimates are not too dissimilar for those village-
level outcomes where data are available for both waves. The post-treatment matched difference 
results suggest that Health VIII improved the quality of care in both village clinics and township 
                                                 
11 The matching in the case of the village-level indicators was done using the county propensity score, the poverty county 
dummy, and village average per capita income from the household data.  
12 This is one area where generalizing to other Health VIII provinces would be dangerous. Within the broad scope of Health VIII, 
different counties gave priority to different packages of medical interventions. None of the project counties in Gansu selected 
immunization as their priority area. It may well be that the apparent negative effects of Health VIII in Gansu were avoided in 
counties giving priority to immunization. These were, however, a minority of Health VIII counties. Only 20 out of 70 had 
selected immunization as a priority area, each county being able to select more than one area. So, the result is relevant to the 
majority of Health VIII counties, and even if it were not true of the counties where immunization was selected as a priority, it 
serves as a warning that unless prioritized, immunization could suffer from the type of reform package introduced by Health VIII.    21
hospitals, but not significantly so. There is a hint that the impact was larger in the case of the 
township hospital.    22






































Health  -0.022 0.203 0.231  0.168 0.171  0.169  0.191 
   (0.37)  (3.34)  (3.52)  (2.55) (2.58)  (2.57) (2.40) 
Chronic illness  -0.056  0.024  0.011  -0.033  -0.033  -0.033  0.009 
   (4.46)  (2.51)  (1.28)  (2.47) (2.49)  (2.48) (0.45) 
Disability 0.023  0.044  -0.009  -0.012  -0.013  -0.012  0.111 
   (0.48)  (1.03)  (0.23)  (0.23) (0.25)  (0.23) (1.61) 
Sick days  -1.536  0.667  0.061  -1.291  -1.272  -1.270  0.487 
   (3.39)  (1.86)  (0.23)  (2.70) (2.66)  (2.66) (0.47) 
Doctor visits  -1.405  -0.669  -0.743 -0.688  -0.665  -0.665  0.770 
   (8.25)  (7.52) (9.74)  (3.47) (3.35)  (3.35)  (2.03) 
Doctor visit expenses  16.567  -97.529  -99.192  -72.507  -71.594  -71.434  -12.418 
   (0.91)  (3.91) (4.24)  (2.56) (2.52)  (2.52)  (0.21) 
Medicine expenses  -59.884  -6.884  -12.148  -57.041  -55.459  -55.101  -5.558 
   (3.87)  (0.70) (1.48)  (3.48) (3.39)  (3.38)  (0.17) 
Catastrophic expenses  -0.144 -0.029  -0.073  -0.112 -0.110  -0.109  -0.142 
  (7.78)  (2.69) (6.20)  (5.45) (5.48)  (5.45)  (4.32) 
Notes: absolute values of t-statistics or z-statistics in parentheses. Sample includes 1116 individuals living in project counties, and 6465 individuals 
living in non-project counties.    23
Table 7: How people living in Health VIII counties are matched to people living in non-project counties 
  Non-project counties and propensity score   
 Tongwei  Tianzhu  Qin'an  Yongjing  Yuzhong  Yongdeng  Total  Health VIII 
counties and 
propensity score    0.0375 0.0000 0.1268 0.1153 0.0546 0.0774   
Dingxi 0.9997      389  9    1  399
Wudu 0.2592  2    433  59      494
Kang 0.1048  13  6  73  117  13    222
Total   15  6  895  185  13  1  1,115
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Table 8: Results for target child  
  Post-treatment 
difference 
Control function  Post-treatment 
difference with 
matching 
Ill during last year  -0.062 -0.040  -0.104 
   (1.57) (0.76)  (1.67) 
Child taken to doctor during last year  -0.091  -0.110  -0.153 
   (2.32) (2.27)  (2.51) 
Child taken to doctor during last year conditional on child being ill     -0.098  -0.046 
     (2.36)  (0.84) 
Provider choice conditional on child being taken to a provider  -0.128  0.076  0.156 
  (1.77) (1.96)  (1.97) 
Note: Sample includes 186 target children living in project counties, and 1148 target children living in non-project counties.   25
































Clinic exists in village  -0.286  -0.370 -0.310 -0.373 -0.262 -0.262 -0.400 
    (1.76) (1.86) (1.32) (1.90) (1.84) (1.85) (1.93) 
# doctors in nearest village clinic  0.786  -0.719 -2.502 -1.453 -0.191 -0.193 -0.860 
    (0.70) (1.40) (2.40) (0.85) (0.19) (0.20) (0.51) 
# nurses in nearest village clinic  1.714  -0.533 -1.313 0.007 -0.088 -0.088 0.687 
    (2.02) (0.93) (1.28) (0.01) (0.11) (0.11) (0.55) 
# midwives in nearest village clinic  -2.500  -1.754 -2.943 -2.533 -3.058 -3.060 -3.227 
    (5.35) (1.57) (2.38) (0.63) (2.42) (2.52) (0.77) 
Provider  preference  by  villagers  0.143 1.379 0.496 1.713 0.422 0.422 0.760 
    (0.70) (4.48) (1.37) (3.67) (1.72) (1.75) (1.26) 
Immunization rate in village  -6.071  -4.955  17.150  -17.647  -3.323  -3.330  -15.945 
    (1.52) (1.20) (2.98) (2.24) (0.92) (0.95) (2.14) 
Quality of village clinic     0.116  1.520  0.047          
      (1.06)  (4.06)  (0.15)          
Quality of township health center     0.312  0.692  0.387          
      (3.57)  (4.35)  (1.22)          
Notes: absolute values of t-statistics or z-statistics in parentheses. Sample includes 14 villages in project counties, and 86 villages in non-project counties.   26
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The methodological conclusion to emerge is not altogether surprising, namely it makes a 
difference to the estimated impact of Health VIII which estimator is used. Of the different 
estimators used in the analysis, the double-difference estimator combined with matching is likely 
to come closest to the truth. Compared to this, the before-and-after difference—the estimator that 
apparently was in the minds of those setting up the official Health VIII evaluation—does a 
particularly poor job, especially for the individual-level outcomes. Using this estimator one 
would have incorrectly concluded that Health VIII had reduced self-assessed health and doctor 
visits, and had also significantly reduced out-of-pocket expenses.  
The substantive findings suggest that Health VIII has been partially successful in its 
goals. The matched double difference estimator suggests that the project improved self-assessed 
health of the population in general, reduced illness among children, increased doctor visits, and 
reduced the incidence of catastrophic household health spending. It did not, however, 
significantly affect the mean level of household health spending. The results for the target child 
and the village suggest that Health VIII increased use of high-level facilities at least among 
children, hastened the decline of the village clinic, and reduced immunization rates. No 
significant impacts of Health VIII were found on staffing levels in the village clinics that 
survived, or on perceived quality of care at either village or township level.  
Are these findings plausible? Certainly, the goal of Health VIII was to increase use of 
health services, and the finding that doctor visits were positively impacted by the project is 
consistent with this. If doctor visits did indeed improve, it is perfectly plausible that out-of-
pocket payments did not fall. Indeed, the fact that they did not rise, despite the rise in the number   27
of visits, points to Health VIII being successful in putting downward pressure on household 
payments per visit. And if visits increased, and the supply-side investments succeeded in 
improving the quality of care delivered, it is plausible that health also improved. The individual-
level results seem therefore to be consistent with the project’s goals, and with the mechanisms 
put in place to achieve them.  
The more surprising and worrying results come from the analysis of the target child and 
village data. Is it plausible that Health VIII encouraged use of higher-level facilities and 
accelerated the decline of the village clinic? On the face of it, it would seem unlikely, because 
the project documentation talks of Health VIII investing at the township and village levels. 
However, in practice the emphasis in the project appears to be on strengthening (public) 
township facilities rather than (typically private) village providers. And because the Health VIII 
package of measures aimed at strengthening the township hospital—extra equipment, improved 
infrastructure, better management, and measures such as clinical protocols aimed at improving 
the quality of care—implies extra competition for the village doctor, it would not be altogether 
surprising if in the process Health VIII were to crowd the village doctor out of the market.  
Another worrying result is the negative impact of the project on immunization rates. 
Official immunization data are, it must be said, often unreliable, but it is far from clear why they 
should have become increasingly unreliable over this time period, and even less clear why the 
quality of the data should have deteriorated faster in Health VIII counties than in matched non-
project counties. In fact, the peculiarities of China’s approach to immunization financing and 
delivery
13 make it possible that the negative impact on immunization is not a spurious result. 
Vaccinations are delivered by village clinics, township health centers and local public health 
                                                 
13 For a useful description of the system and its problems, see the 2004 International Review of China’s Expanded Program on 
Immunizations (EPI) conducted by the World Health Organization, the United Nation’s Children Fund, the Global Alliance for 
Vaccine Initiative, the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control.   28
institutes (often called CDCs in English). Village doctors are required to deliver immunization as 
a condition for their licensure, and receive little or no public finance for this work—they have 
either to absorb the cost or charge families. CDCs receive a fixed subsidy for immunization and 
other activities, but they are also free to generate revenues from public health and related 
activities, and the actual disbursement of the subsidy is not linked to performance vis-à-vis 
immunization or anything else. China is also unusual by international standards in 
recommending far more immunization sessions in infancy than WHO recommends (twice as 
many, in fact). If it is true that Health VIII hastened the demise of the village clinic, it is not 
inconceivable that, facing the prospect of multiple trips from their village to the township CDC 
to get their child immunized, fewer families ended up taking their children for vaccination. And, 
with little incentive to engage in outreach (they earn no extra revenues by increasing 
immunization coverage but do by selling other services), CDCs are unlikely to have gone 
looking for them.  
All in all, then, a mixed picture emerges of the impact of Health VIII in Gansu province.  
On the ‘plus’ side, the project appears to have improved health outcomes among adults and 
children, encouraged use of health services at least among adults, and reduced the incidence of 
catastrophic household health spending . One the ‘minus’ side, it appears to have encouraged the 
development of and use of higher-level facilities, and in the process may have impacted 
negatively on immunization.  
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